Laypeople's Views on Decision Making in the Health Professions by de Oliveira, Stephanie
Laypeople’s Views 1 
 
 
Laypeople’s Views on Decision Making in the Health Professions 
 
 
A Senior Honors Thesis 
 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirement for graduation with distinction in Psychology 
in the undergraduate colleges of the Ohio State University 
 
By 
 
Stephanie de Oliveira 
 
The Ohio State University 
June 2009 
 
 
Project Advisor: Dr. Hal Arkes, Department of Psychology 
 
 
 
 
Laypeople’s Views 2 
Abstract 
Although actuarial judgment (AJ) is often superior to clinical judgment (CJ), it is 
underused in the health fields for decision making. One potential reason is that people would not 
like to be treated as statistics. This study investigates laypeople’s views about the use of AJ 
versus CJ. Manipulations include domain – a medical context or a psychological context – and 
perceived difficulty of a diagnosis on laypersons’ preference for either method. It is hypothesized 
that laypeople are biased against AJ in general. However there are many potential effects of 
varying context and difficulty. Therefore several possibilities are discussed. 
82 Research Experience Program students participating for credit were randomly 
assigned to two groups in which all materials were presented in a medical or psychological 
context. Participants read unbiased definitions of AJ and CJ, then read scenarios where easy or 
difficult diagnoses were made by physicians or psychologists. After each scenario, participants 
indicated how appropriate it was for the professional to use CJ and AJ. Final questions further 
explored participants’ comfort levels with each method, and their views of health professionals 
and actuarial tool development. 
Results indicated significant interactions between style and difficulty on the rated 
appropriateness of AJ and CJ. After reading the easy scenario, participants were more in favor of 
CJ, but after the difficult scenario they rated AJ as more appropriate. Significant interactions 
between style and domain revealed that CJ was perceived as more appropriate in a psychological 
context, but appropriateness inverted in the medical context. In general, participants were more 
comfortable with CJ in both the medical and psychological groups. Finally, people perceived 
physicians as more knowledgeable than psychologists, and their decision making to be more 
rational. Possible factors influencing these views are discussed in the paper. 
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Laypeople’s Views on Decision Making in the Health Professions 
Two prominent means of integrating information to yield judgments, predictions and 
decisions are the actuarial method (also known as mechanical or statistical judgment) and the 
clinical method. The former method involves treating data in a purely mathematical and 
empirical manner, as exemplified by the use of regression equations and computerized decision 
aids. The latter technique relies on human judgment which may be comprised of intuition, 
expertise, and any mental exercise that yields a decision.  
To understand these two methods as discussed in this paper, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the information-collecting process and the integration of information. The nature of the 
collection process does not define whether the overall judgment is actuarial or clinical; it may 
require the use of diverse activities in order to gather the required information for the decision. 
Holt (1970) outlines six steps that comprise a typical decision making journey for a human 
judge. The judge must decide on a criterion – what it is one wants to predict – and he must also 
choose predictors. Measuring instruments are then selected, and the predictors are given 
empirical trials to test their quality. Data are then gathered and scored if necessary. Finally, 
scores must be combined somehow to make the final judgment or prediction. Holt emphasizes 
that even a method dubbed “actuarial” may have strong clinical influence up to the final step. For 
the purposes of this document, whether a method is termed clinical or actuarial will heavily 
depend on what method is used to integrate the collected data. Therefore, an actuarial method 
does not preclude the use of clinical judgment in an earlier step – it is conceded that humans are 
important even in a mathematical method. Likewise, a clinical method does not preclude the use 
of an actuarial tool in an earlier step. 
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 Much controversy exists over which is the optimal method to be used in the health fields. 
Doctors, nurses, and psychologists are constantly faced with important judgments to make such 
as diagnoses, choosing treatments, and predicting the course of illnesses in different patients. An 
immense amount of information must be examined to make such judgments, and the quality of 
their judgments is crucial to the well-being and survival of many human beings. Controversy 
over the optimal judgment method does not only involve comparing the technical quality of the 
methods (accuracy and reliability, for example), but it also requires comparison of relative 
financial costs, the availability of tools for actuarial judgment, and the preferences and opinions 
of patients being examined. 
 The relative technical quality of actuarial and clinical methods has been heavily 
investigated. It is currently reasonable to suggest that in many situations, actuarial judgment is 
superior to clinical judgment (Dawes, 1979; Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, 
& Nelson, 2000). This is likely true in part due to the biases and inappropriate heuristics that the 
unaided instinctual mind falls for. For example, one’s retrieval of information from memory can 
be biased. Reyes and others found that by only manipulating the vividness of either the 
prosecution evidence or the defense evidence in a court scenario they could affect the jurors’ 
verdicts (Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980). This effect was stronger 48 hours later, when the 
jurors relied more on memory to make their decision. Another common mistake is that people 
judge randomness by how similar a sequence is to their stereotype of randomness, which usually 
has too much variation for the small samples examined. Therefore, people often suppose there is 
a cause in events that are truly random but do not conform to their stereotype of randomness. For 
example, many think that the “hot hand” is behind a series of successful shots in basketball, 
when a random streak of success is not all that unlikely to happen (Gilovich, Vallone, & 
Laypeople’s Views 5 
Tversky, 1985). As a final example, Chapman and Chapman (1967) found that when non-
clinicians observed 45 patient drawings of people randomly paired with diagnoses, participants 
detected non-existent relationships between drawing features and diagnoses. This suggests that 
people often see covariation when there is none, and that by computing the actual correlation 
between, say, the drawing’s eye-size and paranoid diagnoses, this error could be avoided. Human 
intuitive judgment is contaminated with a host of flaws, and this ought to provide motivation for 
seeking superior methods of judgment in critical situations such as the emergency room. 
An actuarial tool to aid in a prediction or judgment task can be developed by using 
objective statistics such as the relationship particular symptoms have with a disorder, the base 
rates of the disorder, and the import of medical history on the diagnosis. The same information 
can be collected every time, the same weights placed on each piece of data, and the same 
integration method can be used. This consistency paired with careful development of the tool 
itself can render better predictive accuracy than an unaided mind.  
Yet such tools are underused (Böckenholt & Weber, 1992). Suggested reasons for under-
use include low awareness of the existence of such methods, low motivation to change from the 
status-quo, and perceived inadequacies of the actuarial tools (Böckenholt & Weber, 1992; Corey 
& Merenstein, 1987). In the medical setting specifically, the use of certain computerized tools 
may offend physicians’ sense of professional autonomy and strip medicine of its “artistic” tone 
(Kaplan, 2000). 
 Problems with assuming the superiority of actuarial methods in clinical, psychological 
settings are worth addressing. It appears reasonable to assert that since general human judgment 
is inferior to actuarial judgment, then judgments specifically made in a clinical setting must also 
be inferior. How could one protest that this domain of judgment has a special barrier against 
Laypeople’s Views 6 
general flaws such as biases? Yet the assertion that actuarial judgment is superior to clinical 
judgment in the psychologist’s office remains very difficult to empirically test at this point in 
time. In medical settings, “gold standards” are available to test the human predictions against 
hard, conclusive evidence – a physician may diagnose a broken ankle and then use an x-ray to 
confirm the diagnosis. But it is unrealistic to say that a clinician may diagnose bipolar disorder in 
a patient and then use a structured interview to confirm the diagnosis. Given the leap taken 
between clinical assumptions and “reality”, and science’s present inability to confirm the 
“reality” behind many mental illnesses, it remains difficult to empirically compare the 
performance of a clinician against the performance of an actuarial test in a clinical context.  
  This obstacle by no means allows professionals to settle for the status-quo. Other facts 
still speak in favor of the actuarial method. First, actuarial methods yield perfectly re-producible 
and consistent judgments. Second, it been demonstrated that even improperly constructed linear 
models perform better than humans in many judgment tasks (Dawes, 1979). As for the low 
availability of usable actuarial tools, they can certainly be developed, as a few have been already 
(Corey & Merenstein, 1987; Medow et al., 2001). It is even possible to make mathematical 
models of human judges that outperform the judges in prediction tasks (Wiggins & Kohen, 
1971). Finally, it is also likely that the financial cost of developing and using an actuarial 
decision aid is lower in the long run than paying the professional for the hours spent at work 
integrating information (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Grove et al., 2000). Taking into account the 
general superiority of actuarial methods, the possibility of developing more tools, and the lower 
cost of doing so, it might be concluded that using actuarial methods is worthwhile even in a 
clinical situation.  
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 Still another objection has been raised and presented as a reason for the low adoption of 
decision aids/ actuarial tools. It is maintained that treating unique individuals as statistics is 
“dehumanizing” (Dawes, 1989; Grove & Meehl, 1996) It has also been demonstrated that 
patients may think less highly of health professionals who rely on decision aids, although this 
finding is somewhat debatable (Arkes, Shaffer, & Medow, 2007; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2006). 
However Dawes (1979), among others, has pointed out that although treating people as numbers 
may be uncomfortable, if this is indeed the best method for offering quality service then it is 
certainly more ethical to use it than not (Grove & Meehl, 1996).  
 From the perspective of a professional well-informed in this area of judgment and 
decision making, there should remain no question that mathematical aids ought to be used when 
they are available and shown to be superior to unaided human judgment. Yet is it ethical to use 
them if those who are paying for this judgment service are against them? Objectors to actuarial 
practice claim that the use is dehumanizing, and it could be considered so if clients felt offended 
or uncomfortable when actuarial methods were used. The research to date has not yielded 
copious information on what the general population’s attitudes are towards actuarial practices. 
Previously-mentioned studies have investigated laypersons’ attitudes towards professionals who 
use or do not use decision-aids. Arkes and colleagues (2007) conducted a series of experiments 
in which subjects gave physicians lower ratings for diagnostic ability if the physician used a 
decision aid to make a diagnosis. Pezzo and Pezzo (2006) found that when doctors’ diagnoses 
were correct, those who used aids were viewed less positively by subjects. Yet when diagnoses 
were incorrect, those who used aids were viewed less negatively than those who did use aid. 
Laypeople’s views about physicians have been studied, but their views on aid-use itself and 
views about psychologists who use aids are not clear. 
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It is possible that a client would think less of a health professional for using a decision aid 
and still support its use. It may be that it is too difficult to avoid the discounting principle which 
proposes that when multiple sources could be causing an event, people may assign responsibility 
primarily to one and discount the other (Kelley, 1973). Therefore the client would attribute a 
correct diagnosis primarily to the aid, consequently making the rating of the professional lower 
due to discounting. Laypersons’ views of actuarial method use should be further investigated, 
particularly in situations where this method performs favorably, or when no information about 
performance is given. 
The current study is designed to discover if, in general, laypersons have an aversion to 
actuarial decision making methods as they are used in clinical or medical settings, particularly 
for diagnostic purposes. It is hypothesized that people will generally be biased against actuarial 
decision making. Although aid use might not be negatively rated, it is hypothesized that clinical 
methods are preferred. It is also suggested that differences between the two settings will 
influence laypeople’s bias strengths. A medical test’s validity can be compared to known 
outcomes, whereas a psychological test’s performance is usually more difficult to assess. People 
may also perceive the two fields differently – a medical decision might seem more “concrete,” 
based on hard physical facts. A psychological analysis may appear more subjective and intuitive, 
given the historical psychoanalytic stereotype involving inkblot tests and couches. Due to the 
potential differences in views, laypersons may feel that statistical procedures are more 
inappropriate to use in a psychological setting than in a medical setting. In other words, 
laypeople may overestimate how objective medical decision making is and overestimate how 
subjective mental assessment is, and an objective way of integrating data may seem more 
appropriate in the former setting. 
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 An opposing argument predicts opposite results. There is evidence that medical 
professionals – physicians in particular – may be endowed with an “aura of omniscience” (Arkes 
et al, 2007, p. 196). As previously cited, they are viewed as more skilled if they do not use 
decision aids to make diagnoses. Because of this phenomenon, decision aids may seem 
unnecessary altogether. A discrepancy in the “auras” of physicians and psychologists as 
perceived by laypeople may yield a discrepancy in ratings of the appropriateness of decision-aid 
use. In the context where omniscience bestowed on the professional is greater – possibly the 
medical context – decision aids would be deemed as less necessary and therefore participants 
would display a stronger bias against them. Because the roles of professional objectivity and 
omniscience in the general population’s perception of health professionals are currently unclear, 
support of either hypothesis is possible. 
 The present study also aims to study effects of perceived difficulty of the diagnosis on 
one’s preference for actuarial or clinical methods. It is hypothesized that an easy diagnosis in 
both settings will yield mild or moderate preferences for clinical decision making, and this effect 
is expected to interact with context although direction is unclear. A difficult diagnosis may 
strengthen the preference for a clinical diagnosis, as it is the prevalent method and more familiar 
to most people. Yet again, an opposing hypothesis is also plausible: the more difficult diagnosis 
may be interpreted as a suggestion that the professional “needs help.” In this situation, 
participants would be more willing to accept actuarial tools rather than less willing. 
The participants in this study shall receive no statements about relative efficacies of 
clinical versus actuarial diagnoses, as the dependent measures test for biases. If participants have 
no such data from which to make a judgment about method preference, the only resource from 
which they may make a decision is their affective response to the definitions. If there is no 
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affective reason to choose one method over the other, i.e. there is no aversion toward 
mathematical methods, then the net results for a group should indicate no bias. Significant 
deviations from such a balance would indicate preference bias stemming from considerations 
other than empirically-tested method efficacy. This bias should be taken into consideration when 
discussing strategies to implement quality actuarial-tool-use in professional practice. 
Method 
Participants 
182 participants were recruited using Ohio State’s Research Experience Program (REP). 
They were undergraduate students enrolled in Psychology 100, for which they received credit 
after participating. Materials were presented on PC’s using MediaLab and variables were 
collected via the same medium.  
Design 
The students were randomly placed into two groups, with group placement determining 
whether a participant will receive materials pertaining to medical issues only or psychological 
issues only. Within each group, every participant will receive two scenarios in which a health 
professional must make one difficult diagnosis and one easy diagnosis. A given participant’s 
easy and difficult scenarios will be presented within the same context, and counterbalanced in 
order. After each scenario, participants are asked in two questions to rate how appropriate it 
would be if the professional used clinical or actuarial decision making. A manipulation check for 
difficulty was included after each scenario in which participants were asked to fill in a blank: “I 
believe that diagnosing this illness is ___.” Five options included “very easy” on one end (coded 
as 1) and very difficult on the other end (coded as 5). After both scenarios were finished, 
additional questions were presented to measure participant attitudes about health professionals. 
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Thus, manipulating professional domain, diagnostic difficulty, scenario order and decision 
making style, yields a 2 (domain, between subjects) x 2 (difficulty, within subjects) x 2 (order, 
between subjects) x 2 (style, within subjects) design. 
Materials 
The computer materials first provided an introduction to the study topic and objective 
definitions of clinical and actuarial decision making. Within the introduction, a reference was 
made to easy and difficult decisions, i.e. health professionals “may need to examine many 
symptoms and tests to diagnose an illness. This could be either a very easy or very difficult 
task.” This was intended to help diminish contrast effects when participants read about two 
different scenarios later in the study. That is, participants would bear in mind the range of 
difficulties that a decision could have and then mentally calibrate the scale. All participants 
received identical definitions written on paper as a reference for later questions. The definitions 
were as follows: 
In the clinical method, the decision-maker combines or processes information in his or 
her head. He or she can rely on mental tools like expertise, intuition, and experience. 
Note that it’s acceptable to use textbooks or journals to look up information – the main 
point is that the decision is made by the person using his or her own mental power. 
In the actuarial method, a statistical procedure is used to reach the decision. This method 
often uses mathematical tools that were developed from studying empirically established 
relationships between events and conditions. Again, it’s acceptable to use textbooks or 
journals to look up information. The main point is that the decision maker, who must 
make the final decision, relies heavily on the mathematical formula’s output.  
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After reading the objective definitions of each method, all groups were given two 
scenarios in which easy or difficult diagnoses were to be made by psychologists or physicians. 
The diseases and disorders selected were fairly uncommon and were presented as rather 
debilitating, though not fatal. The former tactic served to decrease the possibility that the 
participants would superimpose their own knowledge about diagnostic difficulty onto the illness, 
and the latter tactic ensured that the decision would not be taken lightly. The diagnostic difficulty 
manipulation was executed by varying whether there were idiosyncratic symptoms that 
facilitated diagnosis, whether the illness was clearly distinguishable from similar conditions, and 
whether a final statement told the participant directly that the diagnosis was easy or difficult. 
Illnesses chosen for the medical groups were lupus and Crohn’s disease; those for the 
psychological group were schizoaffective disorder and borderline personality disorder. The 
presentation was designed so that each disorder could be displayed as either the easy or the 
difficult ailment – the name itself had no bearing on whether the illness was presumed to be easy 
or difficult to diagnose. The following example is the difficult-diagnosis medical scenario: 
Imagine that a close friend is seeing a physician. Your friend has been complaining of 
fatigue and has been feeling generally ill for a few weeks. The physician suspects that 
your friend may have Lupus. You receive the following information about the disease: 
Lupus resembles a variety of illnesses, and it is difficult to tell them apart. 
The symptoms are vague. 
A misdiagnosis could significantly reduce the quality of life for your close friend. 
Because of this information, you and your friend feel that it is extremely important that 
the correct diagnosis is made. Getting the correct diagnosis is very difficult, so you and 
your friend want to choose the best decision making method possible. 
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The physician has collected information about symptoms and family history, and can 
either give your friend a diagnosis based on expertise (clinical) or on output from a 
computer program (actuarial). You wonder, “What’s a good way to integrate the 
information to get a diagnosis?” 
Next, two questions plus non-numerical answer scales were presented: “In this situation, 
basing a diagnosis on the physician’s clinical judgment is ____” and “In this situation, basing the 
diagnosis on the actuarial computer output is ____”. The scales’ seven points were: Very 
inappropriate, moderately inappropriate, slightly inappropriate, neutral, slightly appropriate, 
moderately appropriate, and very appropriate. The responses were coded with 1 being “very 
inappropriate” and 7 being “very appropriate”. After giving responses regarding decision making 
modes, participants were asked how difficult they believed the diagnosis to be. This 
manipulation check offered five response options, ranging from very difficult (coded as 5) to 
very easy (coded as 1). 
 After completing both scenarios and responses, all participants were asked two more fill-
in-the-blank, multiple-choice questions. The sentences to fill in for the medical group were, “I 
would feel ____ seeing a physician who made diagnoses primarily based on clinical judgment” 
and “I would feel ____ seeing a physician who made diagnoses primarily based on actuarial 
tools’ output.” For the psychology group, the word “psychologist” replaced “physician.” Four 
answer choices included: Very comfortable (coded as 1), comfortable, uncomfortable, and very 
uncomfortable (coded as 4).  
 Subsequently, participants were asked to provide their levels of agreement or 
disagreement to three statements: “It is a good idea to develop good actuarial tools (i.e. ones that 
are more accurate than professionals alone), even if it takes time and money,”  “Actuarial 
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methods are not useful because they yield results based on information about large groups of 
people, whereas professionals make judgments about unique individuals,” and “Using actuarial 
diagnostic methods would make the relationship between professionals and clients less warm and 
personal.” Seven response options range from “strongly disagree” (coded as 1) to “strongly 
agree” (coded as 7). Participants then were asked to agree or disagree with four sentences, using 
the same seven-point response scale as was just mentioned. The last word in each of the four 
sentences was varied: “In general, the way that most physicians/psychologists make decisions is 
intuitive/ rational/ objective/ subjective.” 
Finally, information was gathered to elucidate questions generated by the context 
hypotheses. Participants described their health professional’s decision making methods by rating 
the methods on how intuitive, rational, subjective, and objective they are. To measure perceived 
omniscience, participants rated their respective professionals on a five-point word scale ranging 
from very knowledgeable to very unknowledgeable. A final question asked participants whether 
they had had previous exposure to the actuarial/clinical issue, and to describe such exposure in 
an open-ended reply. 
Results 
Eighty-two participants completed the study for class credit. Analyses were conducted 
twice, once including all participants and once excluding twelve who rated the difficult scenario 
as easier than the easy scenario, leaving 70 participants. Unless noted, results noted as significant 
were significant in both analyses, and data presented in this section are drawn from the 82-
student analyses. No exclusions due to prior knowledge were made, because no students reported 
a strong background in judgment and decision making, and seven participants who expressed 
some familiarity with the illnesses in the study passed the manipulation check.  
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Before more extensive analysis of the data, a manipulation check was conducted to 
ensure that the difficulty level of each scenario was accurately rated by participants. We used a 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) from the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS), version 17.0, on the difficulty ratings for the easy scenario and the difficulty 
ratings for the difficult scenario. Difficulty was a within-subject factor (1= difficult, 2= easy), as 
each participant read a difficult and easy scenario. Between-subject factors were domain (1= 
psychological, 2= medical) and order (1= easy first, 2= difficult first). Scenario difficulty alone 
had a significant effect on difficulty ratings, F(1, 78) = 27.58, p. < .01. The more difficult 
scenario (M = 3.8, SE = .10) was rated as significantly more difficult than the easy scenario (M = 
2.99, SE = .12). Note that the scale ranged from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult).  
 A repeated measures test was performed to examine differences between appropriateness 
ratings of a professional’s decision making method. Thus, the dependent variable was 
appropriateness, as influenced by two within-subjects factors: style (within subjects: actuarial 
and clinical) and difficulty of the decision (within subjects: easy and difficult), plus two 
between-subjects factors: domain (between subjects: psychological and medical) and order of 
scenarios (between subjects: easy first and difficult first). 
 Difficulty was a significant influence on the appropriateness ratings F(1,78) = 8.42, p < 
.01, with higher appropriateness ratings given to easy as opposed to difficult cases (2.67, SE = 
.11 vs. 2.96, SE = .10). However this result was qualified by an interesting two-way interaction 
between style and difficulty, F(1, 78) = 11.50, p < .01. When the participants were reading about 
an easy scenario, clinical decision making was viewed as more appropriate than actuarial 
decision making (M = 2.19, SE .16 vs. M = 3.16, SE = .20) – recall that lower means signify 
more appropriateness. When participants read about a difficult decision scenario, actuarial 
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decision making was rated as more appropriate (M = 2.79, SE .18, vs. M = 3.13, SE = .20). Post-
hoc tests including all subjects showed a significant difference in ratings only in the easy 
scenario in which subjects preferred clinical judgment over actuarial; F(1, 80) = 5.50, p < .05. 
When the data from the 12 subjects who failed the manipulation test were removed, the 
difference in ratings in the easy scenario in which subjects preferred clinical judgment over 
actuarial remained significant; F(1, 68) = 10.14, p < .001.  (All post-hoc tests were collapsed 
over order so as to simplify the calculations.) 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 There was a two-way interaction between the professional’s domain and the style, F(1, 78) = 
6.63, p < .05. For the participants reading about a psychologist, clinical decision making was 
rated as more appropriate than actuarial decision making (M = 2.32, SE = .22 vs. M = 3.23, SE = 
.22). Again, lower numbers convey more appropriateness. For the participants reading about a 
physician, actuarial decision making was rated as more appropriate than clinical decision making 
(M = 2.71, SE = .21 vs. M = 3.00, SE .21). Post-hoc tests including all subjects revealed 
significant differences between appropriateness ratings in the psychological group; clinical 
judgment was significantly preferred over actuarial judgment, F(1,80) = 5.99, p < .05. This 
difference remained when the 12 participants were removed; F(1, 68) = 6.18, p < .05. (M = 2.32, 
SE = .24 vs. M = 3.22, SE = .23).  
Insert Figure 2 here. 
 Another repeated measures test was used to check for a difference between participants’ 
comfort levels. Comfort ratings, from 1 as most comfortable and 4 as most uncomfortable, could 
once again be affected by style, domain, and order, but difficulty was not a factor in this 
question, because it was measured after both the easy and difficult cases had been presented. In 
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the analyses for all participants, no effect of order was found. However, excluding the 12 
revealed a main effect of order: F(1, 66) = 4.13, p < .05. The mean for those who read the easy 
scenario first was 2.42, SE = .08. Those reading the difficult scenario first had a mean response 
of 2.18, SE = .09.  Order entered into no interactions, so this factor will not be discussed further. 
Further analyses excluding the 12 participants revealed a main effect of decision style, 
F(1,66) = 7.46, p < .01, with participants being more comfortable with clinical rather than 
actuarial judgment (M = 2.14, SE = .07 vs. M = 2.46, SE = 09). 
There was an interaction between style and domain, F(1, 78) = 5.94, p < .05. For those 
who were in the psychological group, participants were more comfortable with clinical judgment 
(M = 1.98, SE = .10) than actuarial (M = 2.60, SE = .12). Post-hoc tests revealed this difference 
in comfort level to be significant, F(1, 80) = 19.10, p < .01. Those in the medical group were also 
more comfortable with clinical judgment (M = 2.27, SE = .09) than with actuarial (M = 2.37, SE 
= .12), but this difference in comfort ratings was not significant.  
Insert Figure 3 here. 
 A few post-scenario responses differed between domains. Domain had a significant effect 
on ratings of the health professionals’ knowledge, F(1, 80) = 6.20, p < .05. Physicians were rated 
as more knowledgeable (M = 1.37, SE = .08) than psychologists (M = 1.63, SE = .08), although 
both were considered knowledgeable. Domain had an effect on how rational the health 
professional’s decision making was considered, F(1, 80) = 4.16, p < .05. Physicians’ decision 
making (M = 2.19, SE = .15) was considered more rational than psychologists’ (M = 2.63, SE = 
.15). Finally, those in the medical condition were more strongly in favor of developing actuarial 
tools that those in the psychological group (M = 2.12, SE = .14 vs. M = 2.61, SE = .14), F(1, 81) 
= 6.08, p < .05. In the response scales for these questions, values closer to 1 indicated stronger 
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agreement and values approaching 7 indicated more disagreement. Other post-scenario 
questions’ answers did not significantly differ according to domain, difficulty, or order. For the 
“usefulness” statement, the overall mean response was 3.28, SD = 1.40. The statement about 
professionals’ warmth had an overall mean response of 2.80, SD = 1.37. 
Discussion 
These results are informative with regard to laypeople’s perspectives on decision making 
methods. The hypotheses must be revisited in light of the results, and future studies for further 
clarification ought to be considered. Firstly, it was discovered that participants find clinical 
decision making more appropriate in psychological contexts, and in medical contexts actuarial 
decision making is rated as more appropriate. The differences between appropriateness ratings 
within each domain, as analyzed by post-hoc tests, revealed a significant difference in ratings in 
the psychological group.  
Such inequality in appropriateness ranking, affected by style and domain, is not a result 
of any biasing information presented in the study. The definitions of clinical and actuarial 
decision making were not crafted to favor either as the normative method. Also, participants’ 
responses were probably not influenced either by previous experience with or knowledge of 
judgment and decision making research. The final question queried them on such experience and 
knowledge, and no one described any experience that was substantially above average. 
Therefore, were there no other biasing agents present, the participants would have rated each 
form of decision making as equally appropriate or inappropriate. Yet results show that some sort 
of bias is present.  
One possible source of bias is the presence of stereotypes about the psychological and 
medical professions. This relates to the hypothesis that medical decision making is viewed as 
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more objective than psychological decision making, rendering objective tools more appropriate. 
Some measures in the study support this explanation. Participants in the medical condition were 
significantly more strongly in favor of developing actuarial tools for professionals than those in 
the psychological condition. Doctors were also rated as more knowledgeable than psychologists, 
although this says little about their decision making style. However, participants were directly 
asked to rank how objective, subjective, rational, and intuitive their professional’s decision 
making was. Answers did not differ significantly between groups except for responses to the 
“rational” question. In slight support of the hypothesis, physicians’ decision making was rated as 
more rational than that of psychologists, but the hypothesis would have been more strongly 
supported had the medical group also rated physicians as more objective or psychologists as 
more subjective/intuitive.  
The partial support for the stereotype difference hypothesis formulated here is consonant 
with findings summarized by Mills (2009), who reports that although most Americans view 
psychology favorably, they do not consider it a hard science. It is viewed as less valuable than 
medicine, and many underestimated the time it takes to get a license as a psychologist (thus 
explaining the difference in “knowledgeable” ratings). Finally, when asked how much they 
“associate the practice of psychology with scientific techniques and practices,” 49% of 
respondents answered “somewhat” whereas only 22% answered “a great deal” (Mills, 2009, p. 
29). While this study did not always directly compare beliefs about psychology with those about 
medicine, it is reasonable to conclude that some differences do exist and that they may be 
informing the way laypeople rank the appropriateness of actuarial and clinical methods.  
The similar measure of comfort with each style in both domains can not be entirely 
explained by differences in stereotypes, as these measures yielded different results than the 
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appropriateness measures. The medical group responded with no significant difference in their 
comfort ratings, but the psychological group’s responses showed significantly more comfort with 
clinical judgment. Comfort ratings may be a more affect-driven response, as one’s comfort is not 
only influenced by cognitive judgments but also by emotions and physical state. Interestingly, 
both groups reveal conflicts in their responses between the appropriateness and comfort 
measures. Psychological participants are significantly more comfortable with clinical judgment 
but find it more appropriate than actuarial. Medical participants are more comfortable with 
clinical judgment yet rated actuarial as more appropriate, although their style ratings within each 
measure were not significantly different. This conflict may be indicative of a higher level of 
thinking on the part of the participants. On an emotional level, a situation may be uncomfortable; 
situations like setting a broken bone or humanely killing a suffering pet all yield great 
discomfort. Yet in many such situations, taking the less comfortable course of action is viewed 
as more appropriate. The same principle may be at work in this study. 
The presented hypotheses also suggested reasons why people may prefer one form of 
decision making over another as difficulty of the decision increases. Results revealed higher 
appropriateness rankings for the actuarial method in the difficult scenario, but higher rankings 
for the clinical method in the easy scenario. However, the difference was only significant in the 
easy scenario. One potential reason for this is that participants may have interpreted the difficult 
decision as one for which the professional needed help in making a diagnosis. Such help in the 
form of an actuarial decision aid was deemed more appropriate than reliance on clinical 
judgment alone.  
Another potential reason for the greater appropriateness of actuarial judgment in the 
difficult scenario is participants’ beliefs about the quality of unaided human judgment. While 
Laypeople’s Views 21 
professionals across groups were generally rated as very knowledgeable, and physicians 
especially so, the person who perceives a decision to be difficult ranked the actuarial method as 
more appropriate. This suggests that if a professional’s “aura of omniscience” is challenged, 
laypeople may be quite willing to accept the use of decision-aids and even support them.  
In the real world, it is questionable whether professionals would be willing to let patients 
know how difficult a judgment is. Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, and 
Woloshin (2008) have suggested that there has traditionally been a sense of paternalism on 
doctors’ part in the doctor/patient relationship. This combined with trust from patients would 
only contribute to the “aura of omniscience.” Braddock, Edwards, Hasenberg, Laidley, and 
Levinson (1999) examined 3,552 decisions made by physicians, such as medication decisions 
and laboratory tests, and found a relationship between decision complexity and completeness of 
the informed decision making process1. It was found that 17.2% of basic decisions were 
complete – i.e. the patient was properly informed and involved – but only 0.5% of the complex 
decisions were complete ones. Such complex decisions would fall into the “difficult scenario” of 
this study, where the decision was explicitly said to be difficult and where participants were 
more in favor of actuarial judgment! If participants do not know about uncertainties or 
difficulties in a decision, they are not as likely to support actuarial judgment. Therefore, 
professionals wishing to employ decision aids but who are concerned that this would be met with 
disapproval may consider disclosing the difficulty of the decision. The good news from 
Braddock and colleagues’ paper is that in complex decision situations doctors did a significantly 
better job of discussing some elements of the decision, namely pros and cons, alternatives, 
uncertainties, the patient’s role and patient preference. Increasing such transparency with patients 
                                               
1
 The researchers listed criteria for conducting a complete informed decision. This type of decision involves the 
patient, who is informed about various aspects of the decision such as pros and cons, alternatives, etc.  
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may help them gain a more realistic view of physicians’ decision making and may improve their 
view of decision aids.  
Closely related paths for further study include elucidating what stereotypes of medical 
and psychological professions (and professionals) are held by laypeople. Understanding in 
greater detail whether these beliefs differ and how they differ would help explain the interaction 
between domain and style found in this study. Understanding laypeople’s beliefs about the 
quality of professionals’ judgments would also help explain biases in decision making method 
preferences. Finally, a closely-related question asks whether comfort with actuarial judgment 
increases when familiarity with the style is increased. 
This paper clarifies the accuracy of the objection that actuarial methods are unfavorable 
because they degrade unique individuals and that laypeople find aids undesirable. The final point 
to consider is that although biases in preferences were detected, at times favoring clinical and at 
times favoring actuarial, the overall appropriateness ratings for both methods were positive. 
Pezzo and Pezzo (2005) found that undergraduate students rated decision aids as less appropriate 
than did medical students, and that medical students were aware of this difference. The authors 
suggest that “perhaps it is not physicians’ lack of confidence in decision aids but their awareness 
of patients’ lack of confidence that translates into a reduced use of the aids” (p.53). Yet one must 
bear in mind that although the difference exists in ratings of appropriateness, in both their study 
and this one decision aids were rated as at least moderately appropriate. Furthermore, the use of 
decision aids does not necessarily decrease a patient’s satisfaction with his/her medical 
experience (Arkes et al., 2007; see studies 2, 3, and 4). The professional’s diagnostic ability may 
be perceived as inferior if s/he uses a decision-aid, but patients may nevertheless find the use of 
aid appropriate and they may be equally satisfied with the experience. Thus, such objections 
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ought not to be used against actuarial judgment if it is more accurate and reliable in a given 
context.  
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Appendix A 
Interaction Figures  
 
Figure 1.  Interacting effects of difficulty and style on appropriateness ratings. All subjects 
included. 
 
 
 
Laypeople’s Views 27 
Figure 2. Interacting effects of domain and style on appropriateness ratings. All subjects 
included. 
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Figure 3. Interacting effects of domain and style on comfort level. All subjects included. 
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Appendix B 
Presented Materials 
Definitions 
 In the clinical method, the decision maker combines or processes information in his or 
her head. He or she can rely on mental tools like expertise, intuition, and experience. Note that 
it’s acceptable to use textbooks or journals to look up information – the main point is that the 
decision is made by the person using his or her own mental power. 
 In the actuarial method, a statistical procedure is used to reach the decision. This method 
often uses mathematical tools that were developed from studying empirically established 
relationships between events and conditions. Again, it’s acceptable to use textbooks or journals 
to look up information. The main point is that the decision maker, who must make the final 
decision, relies heavily on the mathematical formula’s output. 
Scenarios 
 Difficult scenario. Imagine that a close friend is seeing a physician/psychologist. Your 
friend has been (feeling generally ill) / (behaving quite strangely) for a few weeks. The 
physician/psychologist suspects that your friend may have Lupus/ Borderline Personality 
Disorder2. You receive the following information about the disease/disorder: 
Lupus/ Borderline Personality Disorder resembles a variety of illnesses, and it is difficult 
to tell them apart. 
The symptoms are vague. 
A misdiagnosis could significantly reduce the quality of life for your close friend. 
 
                                               
2
 For the medical and psychological conditions, Crohn’s disease and Schizoaffective disorder, respectively, were 
also at times randomly presented to participants. 
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Because of this information, you and your friend feel that it is extremely important that the 
correct diagnosis is made. Getting the correct diagnosis is very difficult, so you and your friend 
want to choose the best decision-making method possible. The physician/psychologist has 
collected information about symptoms and family history, and can either give your friend a 
diagnosis based on expertise (clinical) or on output from a computer program (actuarial). You 
wonder, “What’s a good way to integrate the information to get a diagnosis?” 
 Easy scenario. Imagine that a close friend is seeing a physician/psychologist. Your friend 
has been (feeling generally ill) / (behaving quite strangely) for a few weeks. The 
physician/psychologist suspects that your friend may have Crohn’s disease/ Schizoaffective 
disorder3. You receive the following information about the disease/disorder: 
Crohn’s disease/ Schizoaffective disorder resembles a variety of illnesses, but it is easy to 
tell them apart. 
The symptoms are very unique and specific. 
A misdiagnosis could significantly reduce the quality of life for your close friend. 
Because of this information, you and your friend feel that it is extremely important that the 
correct diagnosis is made. Getting the correct diagnosis is very easy, but you and your friend still 
want to choose the best decision-making method possible. The physician/psychologist has 
collected information about symptoms and family history, and can either give your friend a 
diagnosis based on expertise (clinical) or on output from a computer program (actuarial). You 
wonder, “What’s a good way to integrate the information to get a diagnosis?” 
Post-scenario questions 
1) Please use the given options to complete the following sentences: 
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 For the medical and psychological conditions, Lupus and Borderline Personality Disorder, respectively, were also 
at times randomly presented to participants. 
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In this situation, basing a diagnosis on the physician’s clinical judgment is ___. 
□ Very appropriate 
□ Moderately appropriate 
□ Slightly appropriate 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly inappropriate 
□ Moderately inappropriate 
□ Very inappropriate 
2) In this situation, basing the diagnosis on the actuarial computer output is ___. 
□ Very appropriate 
□ Moderately appropriate 
□ Slightly appropriate 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly inappropriate 
□ Moderately inappropriate 
□ Very inappropriate 
3) I believe that diagnosing this illness is ___. 
□ Very difficult 
□ Difficult 
□ Neither easy nor difficult 
□ Easy 
□ Very easy 
Final Questions 
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1) I would feel ____ seeing a physician/psychologist who made diagnoses primarily based on 
clinical judgment.  
□ Very Comfortable 
□ Comfortable 
□ Uncomfortable 
□ Very uncomfortable 
2) I would feel ____ seeing a physician/psychologist who made diagnoses primarily based on 
actuarial tools’ output. 
□ Very Comfortable 
□ Comfortable 
□ Uncomfortable 
□ Very uncomfortable 
3) It is a good idea to develop good actuarial tools (i.e. ones that are more accurate than 
professionals alone), even if it takes time and money. 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree   
4) Actuarial methods are not useful because they yield results based on information about large 
groups of people, whereas professionals make judgments about unique individuals. 
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□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree   
5) Using actuarial diagnostic methods would make the relationship between professionals and 
clients less warm and personal. 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree   
6) In general, the way that most physicians/psychologists make decisions is intuitive: 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
□ Disagree 
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□ Strongly disagree   
7) In general, the way that most physicians/psychologists make decisions is objective: 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree   
8) In general, the way that most physicians/psychologists make decisions is subjective: 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree   
9) In general, the way that most physicians/psychologists make decisions is rational: 
□ Strongly agree 
□ Agree 
□ Slightly agree 
□ Neutral 
□ Slightly disagree 
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□ Disagree 
□ Strongly disagree   
10) In general, most physicians/psychologists are: 
□ Very knowledgeable 
□ Knowledgeable 
□ Neither knowledgeable nor unknowledgeable 
□ Unknowledgeable 
□ Very unknowledgeable  
11) Have you had any coursework on judgment and decision making, AND/OR did you already 
have knowledge about issues involved in this study (illnesses, decision-making)?  
a) Yes 
b) No 
If yes, please describe any prior knowledge you already had concerning issues involved in this 
study: 
[open-ended answer box] 
Debriefing 
Thank you for participating in our study. We are interested in investigating laypeople’s 
opinions about decision-making methods in the health professions. If you would like to receive 
more detailed information and study results, just put a checkmark by your name on the 
attendance sheet as you leave.  We’ll be happy to e-mail you the results of the study as soon as 
we complete it.  
 
 
